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Abstract 
Cognitive effort is costly and this cost likely influences the activities that 
children engage in. Yet, little is known about how school-age children perceive 
cognitive effort. The subjective value of cognitive effort, that is, how valuable or 
costly effort is perceived, was investigated in 73 7- to 12-year-olds using an effort-
discounting paradigm. In two studies, it varied with task difficulty but not age, was 
predicted by actual effort engagement but not actual success, and related to trait 
interest in effortful activities and proactive control engagement. Children are sensitive 
to cognitive effort and use it to guide behaviors, suggesting that poor performance 
may often reflect reluctance to engage cognitive effort rather than low ability. 
Key words: cognitive effort, need for cognition, cognitive control, executive 
function, children. 
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Like physical effort, cognitive effort is costly. This cost largely influences the 
activities that we engage in, leading us to opt for a challenging task that carries 
potential for learning or an easier one that may seem more immediately rewarding. 
Indeed, the extent to which one seeks, engages in, and enjoys cognitive effort predicts 
intrinsic motivation and academic achievement (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 
1996). As cognitive control is intrinsically effortful, the way one perceives and values 
cognitive effort may directly affect regulation of thoughts and actions. In childhood, 
failure to engage efficient cognitive control may not necessarily reflect poor ability, as 
is generally assumed, but instead reluctance to engage effort, potentially calling for 
different interventions. Yet, little is know about the subjective cost of cognitive effort 
in children. The present studies aimed to fill this gap by investigating how children 
perceive cognitive effort and use it to guide their behaviors. 
 Cognitive effort is usually thought to reflect the extent to which cognitive 
resources are engaged (i.e., attention is invested) in a specific activity (e.g., Dunn, 
Lutes, & Risko, 2016; Efklides, Kourkoulou, Mitsiou, & Ziliaskopoulou, 2006). 
Although it was initially thought to relate to glucose consumption through brain 
activity (Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007), cognitive effort may instead reflect the 
opportunity cost related to not being able to engage cognitive resources in alternative 
(and potentially more rewarding) tasks (Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013). 
Importantly, actual (or objective) cognitive effort carries a perceived (or subjective) 
cost that only moderately relates to actual effort expenditure and also depends on 
other factors such as personality or mood states (Efklides et al., 2006; McGuire & 
Botvinick, 2010). In adults, the subjective value or cost of cognitive effort, that is, 
how valuable (or conversely how costly) effort is perceived, has received increasing 
scientific attention lately. Adults find cognitive effort aversive and decide which 
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activities to engage in based on their respective cognitive demands (and thus effort), 
strategically avoiding unnecessary cognitive effort (Dunn et al., 2016; Gold et al., 
2015; Kool & Botvinick, 2014; Kool, McGuire, Rosen, & Botvinick, 2010; McGuire 
& Botvinick, 2010; Westbrook & Braver, 2015). When given the choice between an 
easier and a harder task, they preferentially select the easier one (Kool et al., 2010) 
even if it means forgoing substantial reward to conserve cognitive effort (Massar, 
Libedinsky, Weiyan, Huettel, & Chee, 2015; Westbrook, Kester, & Braver, 2013). 
Further, the value of cognitive effort varies as a function of contextual factors and 
individual preferences. Specifically, adults are more likely to avoid a very difficult 
than a moderately difficult task, and those with low trait interest in effortful activities 
tend to be especially conservative of cognitive effort (Westbrook et al., 2013). It is 
still unclear, though, to what extent the subjective value of cognitive effort may be 
based on actual effort engagement (Westbrook & Braver, 2015). 
 Although cognitive effort may be just as aversive to children as to adults, it is 
unclear whether children use effort to guide their behaviors, especially given that 
metacognitive abilities are still emerging during childhood. For instance, as children 
tend to overestimate their cognitive abilities (e.g., Flavell, Speer, Green, & August, 
1981), they may underestimate how much cognitive effort they are engaging or will 
need to engage to achieve a task, or neglect this information when deciding to carry it 
out. Alternatively, poor metacognitive abilities may lead children to primarily 
consider effort (or task difficulty), which is potentially very salient to them, and 
overlook the advantages (e.g., greater opportunity to learn, greater efficiency, greater 
reward) of more effortful tasks or strategies, potentially resulting in suboptimal 
behaviors.  
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  Indeed, children often engage cognitive control (i.e., the goal-directed 
regulation of thoughts and actions) in suboptimal ways, despite being capable of more 
mature and efficient control, suggesting poor metacognitive coordination of their 
control abilities (Chevalier, 2015). This is particularly true of proactive control, which 
refers to early control engagement in anticipation of and preparation for upcoming 
task demands to prevent cognitive conflict before it arises (e.g., gathering thoughts 
before a school presentation) (Braver, 2012). Children often neglect this control mode 
when it would be especially efficient (i.e., when the upcoming task is predictable), in 
favor of reactive control, which corresponds to control engagement in the moment to 
resolve cognitive conflict that has arisen (e.g., improvising during questions) 
(Blackwell, Chatham, Wiseheart, & Munakata, 2014; Blackwell & Munakata, 2014; 
Chatham, Frank, & Munakata, 2009; Chevalier, James, Wiebe, Nelson, & Espy, 2014; 
Lucenet & Blaye, 2014; Munakata, Snyder, & Chatham, 2012; Van Gerven, Hurks, 
Bovend’Eerdt, & Adam, 2016). Importantly, children often neglect proactive control 
despite being capable of this control mode and even though they perform better when 
they do engage it (Chevalier & Blaye, 2016; Chevalier, Martis, Curran, & Munakata, 
2015).  
 Could children’s value of cognitive effort account for reactive control 
engagement even when proactive control would lead to better performance? Proactive 
control relies on information maintenance in working memory and sustained 
prefrontal activity. Thus, it requires earlier and greater cognitive effort than reactive 
control, which relies on information retrieval and transient prefrontal activity (Braver, 
Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Braver, 2012; Marklund & Persson, 2012). Children 
who perceive cognitive effort as more costly may be tempted to delay and minimize 
cognitive control engagement, hence preferring reactive to proactive control, even 
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when the latter would yield greater performance. In contrast, children who value 
cognitive effort may be more willing to engage proactive control. Therefore, the 
subjective value of cognitive effort may impact how children engage cognitive control 
(i.e., reactively vs. proactively). 
 The present studies examined how school-age children perceive cognitive 
effort and whether they use it to guide their behaviors. Specifically, it addressed 
whether the subjective cost of cognitive effort can be experimentally assessed in 
children (Westbrook et al., 2013) (Studies 1 and 2), whether it is based on actual 
effort engagement and or successful performance (Study 1), and whether it relates to 
trait interest in effortful activities and proactive control (Study 2).  
Study 1 
Study 1 investigated whether the subjective value of cognitive effort can be 
experimentally assessed in school-age children. If so, it should be affected by similar 
factors as in adults. Specifically, we examined whether children’s subjective value of 
cognitive effort, like adults’, changes as a function of task difficulty. To this end, 7- to 
12-year-old children completed a child adaptation of the Cognitive Effort Discounting 
paradigm originally developed for adults (COG-ED; Westbrook et al., 2013). It 
allowed estimating how much reward they were willing to forgo in order to conserve 
cognitive effort, by asking them to choose between performing a harder task (e.g., 2-
back task) for a high reward or an easier task for a lower reward (e.g., 1-back task). 
Thus, children needed to weigh in the cost associated with each task in terms of 
cognitive effort as well as fatigue, probability of erring, negative feeling, etc., with 
potential benefits in terms of external reward, possibility to learn and improve 
performance, probability of success, positive feeling, etc. We examined whether 
children are sensitive to differences in cognitive effort associated with N-back tasks, 
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which tap working-memory updating, of varying difficulty. If children are sensitive to 
differences in effort and use them to guide behavior, they should conserve cognitive 
effort (i.e., choose the easier task) more as task difficulty increases (i.e., when the 
harder tasks to choose between is of high rather than intermediate difficulty), just like 
adults in prior research (Westbrook et al., 2013). This would speak to the adequacy of 
COG-ED to assess children’s subjective value of cognitive effort. 
 Study 1 also examined to what extent the value of cognitive effort is based on 
actual effort engagement or likelihood of success (Study 1). Pupil dilation is a well-
established physiological correlate of cognitive effort, with larger pupil dilation 
indicating greater effort (e.g., Hepach & Westermann, 2016; Wierda, Rijn, Taatgen, 
& Martens, 2012). Therefore, phasic changes in pupil dilation were recorded while 
children played the N-back tasks. If the value of cognitive effort is directly based on 
actual effort engagement, children should conserve effort more when choosing 
between tasks for which pupil dilation differed more (i.e., greater difference in 
cognitive effort). If it is based primarily on likelihood of success, differences in 
response accuracy should predict effort conservation more than pupil dilation. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 41 children between 7 and 12 years of age (M = 9.22 
years, SD = 1.47, 18 girls, 23 boys). Most participants were Caucasian, from middle 
to high socioeconomic background, although demographic information was not 
systematically collected, and lived in Edinburgh, UK. Participants were recruited 
from a database of families willing to partake in research and through adverts. Prior to 
participating, parental informed consent was obtained and all children gave both 
written and verbal assent. Parents were compensated £10 for their time and travel 
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expenses, and children received top-trump cards as a prize. All data were collected in 
2015. 
Materials and Procedure 
 A trained experimenter tested children individually in the laboratory. Children 
completed a child-appropriate version of the Cognitive Effort Discounting paradigm 
(COG-ED), adapted from Westbrook et al. (2013). The COG-ED, which was run with 
E-Prime 2 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA), comprised three phases 
(Figure 1).  
In Phase 1, children experienced three difficulty levels of the N-back task, 
which require updating information in working memory in order to detect items that 
repeats at a given interval. As in the original version of COG-ED, the N-back task 
was used here because (1) cognitive control demands ensure that the task requires 
cognitive effort, (2) these demands can be easily manipulated, and (3) it is appropriate 
for children (Pelegrina, Lechuga, García-madruga, & Elosúa, 2015). For each 
difficulty level, children were presented with a series of 32 pictures. Each series 
included 4 different pictures (smiley face, cat, house, airplane) presented one at a time 
for 1500 ms and preceded by a 500-ms fixation cross. Each picture was presented 8 
times in each series in an unpredictable order. In the first series (‘blue game’), 
children had to press the response button on a gamepad each time the current picture 
matched the one presented on the previous trial (1-back). If it did not match, they 
were instructed not to press the button. In the second series (‘red game’), they had to 
press the button each time the picture matched the one presented two trials back (2-
back). In the third series (‘green game’), they had to press the button each time the 
picture matched the one presented three trials back (3-back). The fixed order of 
difficulty level helped children understand the task and strengthened the perceived 
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difference in task difficulty. There were 8 targets (for which a button press was 
expected) and 24 non-targets in each series. Feedback was provided after each button 
press (for 1500 ms – response time) as either a green tick sign for targets or a red 
cross for non-targets. Responses (i.e., button press) to targets and no responses to non-
targets were scored as correct, whereas no responses to targets and responses to non-
targets were scored as incorrect.  After each series, scores were displayed on the 
monitor as percent correct for targets and non-targets. Each series was preceded by a 
10-sec fixation cross, which was used to assess baseline pupil dilation, followed by a 
warm-up sequence of 6 pictures. The background color of the monitor matched the 
color of the game corresponding to each series.  
 Phase 2 corresponded to the cognitive effort discounting procedure. Children 
were told that they would be given an opportunity to decide which tasks they would 
subsequently play. Specifically, they had to make two runs of 6 choices. Each choice 
was between two N-back tasks associated with different rewards (i.e., points). 
Children were told that the computer would randomly pick a subset of the tasks they 
chose to play later. They could accumulate points for each game they would get to 
play and later trade these points for a prize. They were told that the more points they 
would win the nicer the prize they would receive and encouraged to try to win as 
many points they could. Importantly, children were told they would have to maintain 
their attention (i.e., play as hard as they could) in order to receive the points 
associated with the task the computer picked. This ensured that children would not 
simply choose the task with the greatest reward, with no intention to engage cognitive 
effort while later performing it. Further, they were told that, provided they maintained 
their attention, they would receive the points regardless of their actual performance on 
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that task, so that choices were driven by cognitive effort associated with each task 
rather than likelihood of success.  
The first run of choices involved the 1-back task (low difficulty) and 2-back 
task (intermediate difficulty). The tasks were labeled both by their names (1-back, 2-
back) and by their color (blue and red games). Within this first run, choice 1 was 
between playing 1-back (blue game) for 100 points or 2-back (red game) for 200 
points. The number of points associated with the harder game (2-back) remained 
constant across all 6 choices, whereas the number of points for the easier game was 
adjusted as a function of the prior response. If the child just chose the easier game, the 
number of points for that game was adjusted down for the subsequent offer. In 
contrast, if the child just chose the harder game, the number of points for the easier 
game was adjusted up. The magnitude of the adjustment was divided by two from one 
choice to the other (+-50 points after choice 1, +-25 points after choice 2, +-12 points 
after choice 3, +-6 points after choice 4, +-3 points after choice 5). For example, if a 
child selected the easier task for 100 points (vs. the harder task for 200 points) on 
choice 1, they were then offered only 50 points (100 – 50) for the easier task on 
choice 2. If they chose the harder task on choice 2, then they were offered 75 points 
(50 + 25) for the easier task on choice 3, etc. The subjective value of cognitive effort 
corresponds to the points offered for the easier task on the last choice of the run (i.e., 
when both options are equally appealing to the participant). A lower value suggests 
that children are willing to conserve cognitive effort (i.e., engaging cognitive effort is 
not valued and viewed as highly costly), whereas a higher value suggests children are 
willing to engage cognitive effort (i.e., engaging cognitive effort is highly valued and 
viewed as not costly). Children then completed a second run of 6 choices, but this 
time between 1-back (low difficulty) and 3-back (high difficulty). 
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 Finally, in phase 3, children played short series (16 pictures) of N-back tasks 
corresponding to two of their choices (one from each choice run), and were told how 
many points they accumulated. All children then received top-trump cards as a prize 
regardless of the points they accumulated. 
Bilateral pupil dilation was recorded while children played the three N-back 
tasks in phase 1 with a Tobii TX300 eye-tracker (Tobii Technology AB, Danderyd, 
Sweden) using a 300 Hz sampling rate and a 5-point calibration procedure completed 
before administering the task. Calibration was repeated if necessary. Children sat 
about 60 cm away from the eye-tracker and computer screen. Pupil size was recorded 
for each 10-sec fixation cross period, which was used as baseline for the following N-
back task, and then during each test block. The baseline screen was of the same 
background color as the following N-back game in order to keep luminance constant. 
Pupil size across both eyes was average at each time point after removing blinks and 
invalid values (i.e., values below 3 mm). Values were then smoothed over a 100-ms 
moving window. Mean pupil size was then computed for each 10-sec baseline period. 
Percent change in pupil size from the corresponding baseline period was computed 
for each value during test block, which were finally averaged for each entire test 
block. 
Statistical Analysis 
The data were analyzed with mixed models and hierarchical regressions. 
Mixed models were used because of the benefits of mixed-models over repeated-
measures ANOVAs and appropriateness for testing both discrete and continuous 
predictors (e.g., Hoffman & Rovine, 2007; Quené & van den Bergh, 2004). 
Preliminary analyses showed that age did not interact with any other effects. These 
interaction terms were therefore trimmed out to better estimate the other effects 
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(Singer & Willet, 2003). Satterthwaite approximations for degrees of freedom are 
reported. Effect sizes were indexed through Pseudo R2. 
Results and Discussion 
Does the value of cognitive effort vary with task difficulty?  
 To establish whether N-back accuracy actually decreased as task difficulty 
increased, a first mixed model explored the effects of stimulus type (Target, Non-
Target, difficulty (1-, 2-, 3-back), and age on N-back performance. The effects of 
target type, F(1, 246) = 126.92, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = .30, and difficulty, F(2, 246) = 
91.06, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = .38, were qualified by a significant interaction, F(2, 246) 
= 27.19, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = .18,. Accuracy to targets decreased more as difficulty 
increased than accuracy to non-targets (Figure 2A). Overall accuracy marginally 
increased with age, F(1, 246) = 3.19, p = .075, Pseudo R2 = .01. These findings 
confirmed that children increasingly struggled with the task as difficulty increased. 
 Next, the subjective value of cognitive effort was explored using a mixed 
model with difficulty of the harder task (2-back, 3-back), age, and N-back accuracy as 
predictors. The effect of difficulty was significant, F(1, 41) = 25.78, p < .001, Pseudo 
R2 = .39, showing that children were more willing to engage cognitive effort when the 
harder option was of intermediate (2-back) rather than high (3-back) difficulty (Figure 
2B). Age and N-back accuracy had no effects, ps > .185. These findings show that 
COG-ED is appropriate to estimate the value of cognitive effort in school-age 
children.  
Is the value of cognitive effort based on actual effort engagement or likelihood of 
success?  
 To check whether children actually engaged greater cognitive effort when N-
back difficulty increased, a mixed model was run on mean percent change in pupil 
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dilation. Difficulty had a significant effect, F(2, 79.5) = 24.85, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = 
.39. Pupil dilation significantly increased across the 1-, 2-, and 3-back tasks, ps < 
.010, hence suggesting that children engaged greater cognitive effort as task difficulty 
increased (Figure 2C). Pupil dilation also significantly increased with age, F(1, 41.2) 
= 6.57, p = .014, Pseudo R2 < .01, suggesting that older children engaged more 
cognitive effort than younger children.  
 Differences in pupil dilation and accuracy between tasks were indexed 
through residual scores. Specifically, mean pupil dilation in 2-back or 3-back was 
regressed on mean pupil dilation in 1-back and the residual scores were saved. The 
same procedure was followed for accuracy. These residual scores were then used to 
examine whether the subjective value of cognitive effort was predicted by task 
differences in pupil dilation and response accuracy, after controlling for age. To this 
end, two regressions were run, one for 1- vs. 2-back choices and the other for 1- vs. 3-
back choices, in which age was entered first, and the corresponding pupil dilation and 
accuracy residual scores were entered second (forward method). For 1- vs. 2-back 
choices, the model retained pupil dilation but not accuracy as significant predictor of 
the value of cognitive effort, F(2, 38) = 3.27, p = .050, standardized β = -.403, p = 
.018 (Figure 2D). For 1- vs. 3-back choices, neither pupil dilation nor accuracy were 
retained in the model, p = .564. Therefore, the greater the difference in actual effort 
engagement between the two tasks, the more children tried to conserve effort, but 
only when choosing between an easy task and a task of intermediate difficulty, not 
between an easy and a hard task. In contrast, differences in actual performance had no 
influence on the subjective values of cognitive effort. 
Study 2 
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Study 2 sought to replicate the effect of task difficulty on the subjective value 
of cognitive effort in a new sample of school-age children and probed whether the 
value of cognitive effort relates to stable features, specifically trait interest in effortful 
activities, as in adults (Westbrook et al., 2013). Children who enjoy effortful activities 
more should perceive cognitive effort as less aversive or as an opportunity to learn, 
and thus be more willing to perform a cognitively demanding task. Furthermore, as 
cognitive control is effortful, the subjective value of cognitive effort should relate to 
how cognitive control is engaged. Note, however, that it would not necessarily yield 
greater success, as engaging more effortful strategies can hamper performance in 
some situations (e.g., K. A. Blackwell & Munakata, 2014; Bocanegra & Hommel, 
2014). This was tested using the AX Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT), a 
well-established measure of proactive control (e.g., Braver et al., 2009; Chatham et 
al., 2009; Chiew & Braver, 2013). Children who value cognitive effort on COG-ED 
should be more willing to engage it early, showing more proactive control 
engagement on AX-CPT. Finally, given that COG-ED estimates the value of effort in 
a context where children are offered the opportunity to win prizes, one may argue that 
prize attractiveness, rather than effort, may drive decisions to choose the harder task. 
Therefore, Study 2 also addressed this possibility. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants included 32 children between 7 and 11 years of age (M = 10.1 
years, SD = 1.04, 11 girls, 21 boys). As in Study 1, most participants were Caucasian 
and from middle to high socioeconomic background, although demographic 
information was not systematically collected. Children were recruited from local 
after-school clubs in Edinburgh, UK. Prior to participating, parental informed consent 
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was obtained and all children gave both written and verbal assent. Children received 
small stationary items as prizes for participating. All data were collected in 2015. 
Materials and Procedure 
 A trained experimenter tested children individually in a quiet room of the 
after-school club. Children first rated the attractiveness of potential prizes (stationary 
items) on a 5-point Likert scale from 1= ‘two thumbs down’ (‘I don’t like them at all’ 
to 5= ‘two thumbs up’ (‘These are great prizes’) printed on a sheet of paper. They 
then completed the same COG-ED paradigm as in Study 1, except that pupil dilation 
was not recorded during the game. As a consequence, the 10-sec fixation cross before 
each run in Phase 1 was removed. Children completed COG-ED on a laptop and 
entered responses by pressing the ‘0’ key on the keyboard instead of a gamepad 
button. Children were told that the more points they would win the more prizes they 
could take home, and encouraged to try to win as many points as they could. In 
addition to COG-ED, children completed an AX-CPT task to assess proactive control 
engagement, and the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS) to assess trait interest in 
effortful activities.  
 The AX Continuous Performance Task (AX-CPT), adapted from Chatham et 
al. (2009), was run using E-Prime 2. In this task, children had to help a dog tell a cat 
that it was feeding time by pressing buttons on the keyboard. Children saw two of 
four possible animal pictures on each trial: dog, cat, frog, and duck. On each trial, a 
centrally presented 12 × 12 cm prime picture was displayed for 500 ms, followed by a 
1200-ms delay, and then by a probe picture alongside two response options (a feeding 
bowl on the left bottom corner and a cross on the right bottom corner) that were 
displayed until a response was entered or the time limit elapsed. Feedback was 
provided for 1000 ms as either two candies along with a light tune for correct and fast 
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responses, one candy with a light tune for correct but slow responses, or a buzzer on a 
neutral background for incorrect responses. On 70% of trials, the prime-probe 
combination corresponded to dog-cat and required pressing ‘a’ (AX trials). The 
remaining trials required pressing ‘l’ and fell into three types, each corresponding to 
10% of trials: dog-frog (AY trials), duck-cat (BX trials), and duck-frog (BY trials). If 
children proactively engage control as soon as they see the dog prime (A), they should 
anticipate and prepare during the delay to respond to the cat probe (X), leading to 
slower responses and more errors on AY than BX trials. In contrast, if they engage 
control reactively, seeing the cat probe (X) should prompt them to decide whether or 
not it was preceded by a dog prime (A), leading to slower responses and more errors 
on BX than AY trials. Children completed 4 demonstration trials, 8 practice trials, and 
40 test trials, which is sufficient to index proactive control engagement in children 
(Chatham et al., 2009). The time limit was infinite on practice trials, whereas on test 
trials it corresponded to 1.5 × the mean response time on the practice trials, in order to 
ensure that the pace was similarly challenging to all participants. Accuracy was 
scored as follows: ‘bowl’ (‘a’) responses within the time limit on AX trials and 
‘cross’ (‘l’) responses within the time limit on all other trials were scored correct; all 
other responses or lack of responses were scored incorrect. Response times (RTs) 
were log-transformed after removing outliers (<200 ms or greater than M+3SD) to 
correct for non-normal distributions and minimize age-related differences in baseline 
RTs. Following Braver et al. (2009), a proactive control index was computed as 
follows: (AY – BX) / (AY + BX), with higher values signaling more proactive control 
engagement.  
 The Short form of the Need for Cognition Scale (NCS; Cacioppo et al., 1996) 
was administered in an interview format. NCS comprises 18 items that assess how 
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much the respondent engages in and enjoys activities that require cognitive effort 
(e.g., ‘I would prefer difficult to simple problems’ or ‘Learning new ways to think 
doesn’t excite me very much’). Complex formulations were reworded to ensure 
children could easily understand all items (e.g., original item 6 ‘I find satisfaction in 
deliberating hard and for long hours’ was reworded as ‘I enjoy thinking hard and for 
long hours’). The questionnaire is provided in Appendix A. Children answered each 
item by rating how much they felt it described them using a 5-point Likert scale from 
‘not at all’ (two thumbs down) to ‘very much’ (two thumbs up). NCS scores 
correspond to the sum of points for each response, after reversing some of the items 
so that more points correspond to greater need for cognition. The NCS showed 
acceptable internal consistency, Cronbach’s α = .79. 
Statistical Analysis 
 The data were analyzed with mixed models following the same approach as in 
Study 1. The relations of the values of cognitive effort to NCS scores and proactive 
control index were examined using Pearson’s correlations. 
Results and Discussion 
Does the value of cognitive effort vary with task difficulty? 
 As in Study 1, the mixed model on N-back accuracy showed main effects of 
stimulus type, F(1, 32) = 124.59, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = .32, and difficulty level, F(2, 
192) = 112.15, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = .46, alongside a significant interaction, F(2, 
192) = 34.53, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = .26. Again, difficulty had a stronger effect on 
accuracy to targets than to non-targets (Figure 2A). Overall accuracy significantly 
increased with age, F(1, 192) = 4.96, p = .027, Pseudo R2 = .02. 
 The mixed model examining how the value of cognitive effort varied as a 
function of difficulty of the harder task (2-back, 3-back), age, and N-back accuracy 
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showed a main effect of difficulty, F(1, 32) = 8.07, p = .007, Pseudo R2 = .20. As in 
Study 1, children were more willing to engage cognitive effort when the harder option 
was of intermediate (2-back) rather than high (3-back) difficulty (Figure 2B). Age and 
N-back accuracy had no effects, ps > .816.  
Complementarily, following the exact same procedure as in Study 1, the 
difference in accuracy between 1- and 2-back or between 1- and 3-back was entered 
after age as potential predictors of the values of cognitive effort for the first and 
second choice runs, respectively. The models did not retain these factors, further 
suggesting that N-back accuracy did not relate to the subjective value of cognitive 
effort on COG-ED. 
These results fully replicate Study 1 findings. 
Does the value of cognitive effort relate to proactive control and trait interest in 
effortful activities? 
 To examine whether children engaged proactive control in the AX-CPT, 
response times (RTs) and accuracy on the AX-CPT (Table 1) were probed using two 
mixed models with trial type and age as predictors. For RTs, there was a significant 
effect of trial type, F(3, 91.5) = 13.41, p < .001, Pseudo R2 = .30, whereas the effect 
of age failed to reach significance, F(1, 31.7) = 3.25, p = .081, Pseudo R2 < .01. RTs 
were slower on AY trials than all other trial types, including BX trials, ps < .005, 
which is indicative of proactive control engagement. Trial type also affected accuracy, 
F(3, 96) = 6.56, p < .001, Pseudo R2 < .17, due to greater accuracy on AX than all 
other trial types, ps < .010. All other pairwise comparisons, including AY vs. BX 
trials, were not significant, ps > .173. The effect of age was not significant either, p = 
.541. Given that RTs, but not accuracy, captured proactive control engagement, the 
proactive control index was computed for RTs only. 
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 The relations of subjective values of cognitive effort to proactive control 
engagement (M = .023, SD = .023), and NCS scores (M = 60.8, SD = 11.2) were 
investigated using Pearson’s correlations. The subjective value of cognitive effort for 
1- vs. 2-back choices was significantly correlated with proactive control, r = .443, p = 
.018, and NCS scores, r = .368, p = .038 (Figure 3), even after controlling for age, r = 
.436, p = .023 and r = .444, p = .020, respectively. In contrast, the subjective value of 
cognitive effort for 1- vs. 3-back choices did not correlate with proactive control and 
NCS scores, all ps > .437. Finally, we also examined whether the subjective values of 
cognitive effort were correlated with prize rating (M = 3.2, SD = 1.2), as children may 
be more willing to engage effort to win prizes they find more attractive, but no 
significant correlations were observed, all ps > .439. The results suggest the 
subjective value of cognitive effort, as measured by COG-ED, relates to trait interest 
in effortful activities as well as proactive control engagement on a different task. 
General Discussion 
 The present studies examined how children perceive cognitive effort and use it 
to guide behaviors, adapting COG-ED to school-age children. They yielded three 
main findings. First, the subjective value of cognitive effort varied with task 
difficulty, but not age. Second, it was based in part on actual effort engagement, as 
evidenced by pupil dilation, rather than task performance. Third, it related to broader 
trait interest in effortful activities, as assessed by the NCS, as well as proactive 
control engagement on AX-CPT.  
 The child adaptation of COG-ED is a sensitive and valid measure of the value 
of cognitive effort in children, as suggested by the replication in children of two key 
findings observed with younger and older adults (Westbrook et al., 2013): (1) 
conservation of cognitive effort increased with task difficulty, and (2) the value of 
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cognitive effort related to trait interest in effortful activities. Critically, Study 1 added 
the novel finding that the value of cognitive effort (when choosing between tasks of 
low and intermediate difficulty) is based on actual effort engagement, further 
speaking to the validity of COG-ED. Specifically, children who engaged much more 
effort on 2-back than 1-back, as shown by the difference in pupil dilation between the 
two tasks, were especially likely to conserve cognitive effort. In contrast, the value of 
cognitive effort was not influenced by the difference in accuracy between the two 
tasks, or prize attractiveness. In other words, children avoided the harder task not 
because of the lower likelihood of success or lower motivation to win the prize, but 
because of the additional effort it needed. These findings show that children are 
already sensitive to variations in their cognitive effort across tasks and can use this 
information to guide behaviors.  
This conclusion, however, may be limited to situations in which (1) task 
success may not matter, (2) tasks may not be seen as enjoyable, (3) children may not 
necessarily perceive the intrinsic benefit of engaging cognitive effort in terms of 
learning or improving their cognitive abilities (either because they do not perceive the 
possibility to learn or because learning that particular ability is not deemed attractive 
or desirable), (4) and cognitive effort engagement is mostly oriented toward extrinsic 
benefit or reward (prizes). In many other situations, children’s decisions to engage or 
conserve cognitive effort may additionally be driven by perceived intrinsic benefits of 
learning through cognitive effort (e.g., a task that matters to them) and other factors 
such as how engaging and enjoyable the task is (e.g., children may engage greater 
effort toward a fun video game than more ‘boring’ homework), all of which may not 
be appropriately captured by COG-ED. Nevertheless, situations akin to COG-ED, 
involving tasks that are not perceived as enjoyable and mostly extrinsic benefits, are 
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common in a child’s life, including many school (e.g., working on math problems) or 
extracurricular activities (e.g., learning music theory) in which children may struggle 
to perceive the intrinsic benefits in terms of personal development or later life success 
and instead focus on extrinsic benefits (e.g., please the parent or teacher or get a 
reward). 
 Interestingly, the subjective value of cognitive effort did not vary with age. 
This finding was unexpected given prior research showing lower subjective values in 
older than younger adults and prior suggestion that lower control may be associated 
with lower effort value (Westbrook et al., 2013). This may not be true of children 
because younger children have lower control but also lower metacognition, which 
may lead them to overestimate their control abilities. However, because the present 
studies relied on small and non-evenly distributed samples within a relatively large 
age range, no definite conclusion can be drawn about age effects on the subjective 
value of control. Further research should include larger samples of children, span a 
wider age range, and follow children longitudinally to properly chart out the 
developmental course of cognitive effort perception. 
 The correlations between the subjective values of cognitive effort and trait 
interest in effortful activities and proactive control engagement on AX-CPT point out 
intra-individual stability across contexts. Not only did children who valued effort 
more show greater interest in effortful activities in general, but they were also more 
willing to engage greater cognitive control and do it earlier. This finding suggests that 
value of cognitive effort may be key to understand why children do not always use 
proactive control in situations where it is especially appropriate despite being capable 
of that control mode (Chevalier & Blaye, 2016; Chevalier et al., 2015). Children who 
do not engage proactive control may simply consider it is not worth the effort. 
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Performance variability across individuals may not necessarily reflect differences in 
control resources or ability to implement cognitive control, but also differences in 
willingness to engage extant control resources and the cognitive effort they imply 
(although these differences may not systematically translate into different behavioral 
performances). Beyond proactive control, the present findings are consistent with the 
central role of cognitive effort in recent theoretical models of cognitive control, 
according to which cognitive control is engaged toward tasks with the most 
advantageous ratios between cost (effort) and benefit (reward) (Shenhav, Botvinick, 
& Cohen, 2013; see also Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 2013; Westbrook & 
Braver, 2015, 2016).  
The relations between the subjective value of cognitive effort and pupil 
dilation, trait interest in effortful activities, and proactive control on AX-CPT were 
consistently observed for choices involving tasks with a moderate difference in 
difficulty (i.e., low vs. intermediate difficulty), but not tasks with a large difference in 
difficulty (i.e., low vs. high difficulty). Although unexpected, this pattern suggests 
that when one of the tasks is extremely difficult, factors other than actual effort 
engagement and trait interest in effortful activities have a greater weight in 
participants’ choices on COG-ED. Consistently, adults avoid difficult tasks based on a 
metacognitive evaluation of task difficulty that does not necessarily match actual 
performance or effort engagement (as measured by blink rates), especially when the 
task is very difficult (Dunn et al., 2016). Similarly, the especially low accuracy rates 
for 3-back may have led children to build a negative metacognitive evaluation of this 
task that is not directly dependent on how much effort they actually engaged. For 
instance, they may get the sensation that they are pressing the response button 
randomly and thus that they have little control over their performance. This may have 
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influenced choices involving this task to a greater extent than stable traits or 
individual preferences, hence the lower predictive value of the subjective value of 
effort for 1- vs. 3-back than 1- vs. 2-back. Alternatively, children may have perceived 
only little intrinsic benefit in engaging cognitive effort on the N-back in terms of 
learning and improving their cognitive abilities (although some children may have 
opted for the harder task because they perceived it as a chance to improve their 
performance on that challenging task). This perceived intrinsic benefit might have 
been enough to override the perceived cost related to greater cognitive effort when the 
harder task was moderately difficult but not when it was very difficult. If that is the 
case, stronger correlations may have been observed with trait interest in effortful 
activities if N-back had been presented to children as a measure of important mental 
abilities (e.g., intelligence). Whether or not metacognitive evaluation and perceived 
intrinsic benefit are key here, these findings suggest the subjective value of cognitive 
effort is better assessed in children using tasks that only moderately differ in 
difficulty.   
The present findings suggest that children’s motivation to avoid or engage 
cognitive effort in COG-ED is related in part on actual engagement of cognitive effort 
and how much children enjoy cognitive effort in general, but does not seem directly 
dependent on likelihood of success or external reward (prize attractiveness). An 
outstanding question for future research is what particular aspects of cognitive effort 
children weigh in. Such aspects may relate to fatigue, arousal, emotional experience 
associated with effort, enjoyment of the effortful task or effort itself, and 
opportunities to learn new skills or sharpen extant ones. Importantly, future research 
should investigate to what extent these aspects are similarly or differently considered 
across development. 
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 Individual variations in the subjective cost of cognitive effort and trait interest 
in effortful activities may be influenced by children’s intelligence mindset, that is, 
whether children believe intelligence is malleable or fixed. Unlike children with a 
fixed mindset who believe intelligence cannot be changed, those with a growth 
mindset believe intelligence is amenable to improvement through hard work 
(Haimovitz & Dweck, 2016). A growth mindset is associated with greater academic 
improvement over time (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). As it promotes 
learning through effort, children with such a mindset may regard cognitive effort as 
more valuable and be more willing to engage in effortful activities. A critical finding 
from the intelligence mindset literature is that mindsets are influenced by 
environmental factors, such as pedagogical practices and parents’ view of failure 
(e.g., Haimovitz & Dweck, 2016), and can be modified through environmental 
modifications (Blackwell et al., 2007; Haimovitz & Dweck, 2016; Kamins & Dweck, 
1999). For instance, encouraging a growth mindset through effort-oriented praise 
results in greater task persistence and sense of self-worth than praising children’s 
inner abilities, which promotes a fixed mindset (Cimpian, Arce, Markman, & Dweck, 
2007; Kamins & Dweck, 1999). Children’s subjective value of cognitive effort may 
be similarly raised through simple environmental manipulations (e.g., by emphasizing 
learning through effort). Indeed, the value of cognitive effort may even mediate the 
beneficial effect of manipulations targeting intelligence mindsets. Changing how 
children value cognitive effort may be key to early interventions on low cognitive 
control, a major risk factor, especially prevalent in low socioeconomic conditions, 
putting children at risk for academic failure and cascading negative outcomes.  
  In conclusion, children’s inclination to forgo reward to avoid cognitive effort, 
at least in situations where the perceived intrinsic benefit of effort may be limited (as 
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in the present study), shows children are sensitive to variations in cognitive effort and 
can strategically use this information to guide behaviors. The value of cognitive effort 
varies across children, relates to stable trait interest in effortful activities and how 
cognitive control is engaged. Individual differences in behavioral performance during 
childhood do not necessarily reflect differences in ability, but can also reflect 
differences in willingness to engage cognitive effort. 
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Figure 1. Child adaptation of the Cognitive Effort Discounting (COG-ED) paradigm. 
(A) In the first phase, children experienced three N-back tasks of increasing difficulty, 
1-back (blue game—low difficulty), 2-back (red game—intermediate difficulty), and 
3-back (green game—high difficulty). They had to press a button when the current 
picture matched the picture presented one, two, or three trials back, respectively. (B) 
In the second phase, children had to choose between the easy 1-back task for a 
smaller reward and a harder task (either 2- or 3-back) for a greater reward (2 runs of 6 
choices each). The illustration only shows the first choice for the first run. 
  




Figure 2. Cognitive Effort Discounting (COG-ED) performance. (A) Accuracy 
performance in phase 1 was lower for target than non-targets, and decreased as N-
back difficulty increased (Studies 1 and 2). (B) In phase 2, the subjective value of 
cognitive effort was lower for 1- vs. 2-back choices than 1- vs. 3-back choices 
(Studies 1 and 2). (C) Percent change in pupil dilation from baseline increased with 
N-back difficulty in phase 1 (Study 1). Error bars indicate standard errors (A-C). (D) 
Predicted subjective values of cognitive effort as a function of the difference in pupil 
dilation between 1- and 2-back, and 1- and 3-back, respectively (Study 1). ‘Low’ and 
‘High’ correspond to one standard deviation below or above the mean, respectively. 
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Pupil dilation predicted the subjective value of cognitive effort when choosing 
between 1- and 2-back, but not 1- vs. 3-back. 
  




Figure 3. Raw correlations between the subjective values of cognitive effort and 
proactive control (A) or Need for Cognition Scale scores (B) in Study 2. Correlations 
were significant with the subjective value of cognitive effort for choices between 1- 
and 2-back, but not 1- and 3-back. 
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Table 1 
Accuracy and log-transformed response times (RTs) on the AX Continuous 
Performance Task (AX-CPT).  
Trial type Accuracy Log-transformed RTs 
 M SD M SD 
AX trials 0.91 0.08 6.12 0.27 
AY trials 0.73 0.25 6.38 0.24 
BX trials 0.71 0.33 6.11 0.37 
BY trials 0.78 0.26 6.20 0.39 
M = mean; SD = standard deviation; RTs = response times. 
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Appendix A 
Child-friendly version of the Need for Cognitive Scale (NCS) adapted from 
Cacioppo et al. (1996) 
 
1. I would prefer difficult to simple problems. 
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 
thinking. 
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.* 
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure 
to challenge me.* 
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to 
think in depth about something.* 
6. I enjoy thinking hard and for long hours. 
7. I only think as hard as I have to.* 
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.* 
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.* 
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.* 
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 
somewhat important but does not require much thought. 
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 
mental effort.* 
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17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it 
works.* 
18. I usually end up thinking about issues even when they do not affect me personally. 
 
* Items marked with an asterisk were reverse-coded.  
